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1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.  The  confidence  in  and  the  stability  of  the  financial  system  as  a  whole  could  be 
seriously jeopardised by the efforts of criminals and their associates to disguise the 
origin  of  criminal  proceeds.  In  the  fight  against  this  phenomenon,  and  as  a 
complement  to  the  traditional  criminal  law  approach,  the  European  Community 
considered it appropriate to adopt a preventative policy via the financial system. This 
preventative policy was initiated in 1991 with the adoption of Directive 91/308/EEC 
of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of 
money laundering
1. The aim of the rules was to encourage the financial sector to 
identify their customers, to report suspicions of money laundering to the authorities 
and to establish appropriate internal procedures to guard against money laundering. 
This  directive  had,  however,  a  limited  scope  of  application  in  so  far  as  it 
concentrated solely on the laundering of proceeds from specific criminal activities 
(e.g. drugs trafficking).  
2.  The  legal  profession  and  the  anti-money  laundering  rules.  In  2001,  Directive 
2001/97/EC
2 (hereinafter the "Second Directive") amended the preventative regime 
established  by  the  1991  directive.  The  goal  was  to  adapt  to  the  new  money 
laundering  methods  and  techniques  that  had  appeared  in  the  preceding  years. 
Experience  at  international  level  showed  the  increased  use  of  legal  persons  to 
disguise the true ownership and control of illegal proceeds and an increase use of 
professionals to provide advice and assistance in laundering criminal funds. As a 
result, this modification substantially enlarged the material and personal scope of the 
rules:  not  only  was  the  fight  against  money  laundering  no  longer  limited  to  the 
proceeds of drugs trafficking, but also professionals other than financial institutions 
become subject to the anti-money laundering rules in the European Community for 
the first time. In the case of legal professionals, the objective of the new rules was to 
avoid those professionals becoming an instrument of the money launderers that abuse 
or misuse their legal services
3.  
Hereinafter, for the purposes of this document, all references to the "Directive" shall 
be  understood  to  Directive  91/308/EEC  as  amended  by  Directive  2001/97/EC
4. 
Although this Directive has been formally repealed by a new directive
5, this new 
Directive  (so-called  "Third  Directive")  builds  on  the  previous  one  and  does  not 
                                                 
1  OJ L 166, 28.6.1991, p.77. 
2  Directive 2001/97/EC of 4 December 2001, amending the first anti-money laundering Directive 
91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money 
laundering, OJ L 344/76 of 28.12.2001. Text available at: 
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=32
001L0097&model=guichett 
3  It should be noted in this context that criminal legislation prohibits and sanctions money laundering. 
Legal professionals are, as any other person, liable for any infringement (e.g. participating or assisting 
in the commission of money laundering activities) to the criminal code. 
4  For  a  consolidated  version  of  the  first  directive  (as  amended  by  the  second  Directive),  see:  
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/consleg/1991/L/01991L0308-20011228-en.pdf 
5  Directive  2005/60/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  26  October  2005  on  the 
prevention  of  the  use  of  the  financial  system  for  the  purpose  of  money  laundering  and  terrorist 
financing, OJ L 309, 25.11.2005.  
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substantially change the nature of the obligations of the legal profession in relation to 
the prevention of money laundering. 
3.  The examination on the treatment of the legal profession by the Directive. Given the 
novelty of the anti-money laundering obligations for the legal profession as well as 
the special circumstances surrounding this profession, in particular the relationship of 
trust between lawyer and client, the Second Directive required the Commission to 
carry out a "particular examination" of aspects relating to "the specific treatment of 
lawyers and other independent legal professionals" pursuant to that directive. This 
document aims at replying to the call contained in the Second Directive, which the 
Commission committed to respect during the adoption of the Third Directive
6.  
4.  The examination process. The Commission services undertook this examination in 
the autumn of 2005, once a critical mass of Member States having transposed the 
new obligations brought by the Second Directive had been reached (see section 2, 
below). A wide information-gathering exercise involving the major stakeholders was 
launched.  Both  public  authorities  and  the  legal  profession  received  standard 
questionnaires on the application of the Directive
7. Additionally, individual lawyers 
and notaries were invited to give their views on the anti-money laundering directive 
by responding to an on-line questionnaire in several languages
8. In addition to the 
questionnaires,  meetings  were  held  with  some  European  and  international 
associations  on  this  issue.  The  Commission  services  also  used  other  available 
information in the preparation of this document, including in particular reports on the 
mutual evaluations on the implementation by some Member States of the so-called 
40 Recommendations of the FATF
9 conduced either by the International Monetary 
Fund, the FATF itself or Moneyval
10.  
The  response  to  the  information-gathering  exercise  has  been  somewhat 
disappointing. While 17 national organisations representing notaries replied to the 
questionnaire  (out  of  19  possible  replies,  as  notaries  as  such  do  not  exist  in  all 
countries), the response from lawyers professional organisations was significantly 
lower: only national organisations from 7 Member States provided a reply to the 
questionnaire, and some other national organisations limited their reply to statements 
on  the  role  that  lawyers should  have  in  the  fight  against  money  laundering.  The 
response from individual practitioners was not high either: only around 50 replies 
(out of thousands of practitioners), more than half of them from the United Kingdom 
and  Spain.  This  low  response  rate  may  be  partially  explained  by  the  recent 
application of most national laws implementing the Directive (see section 2, below). 
In addition to the difficulties in receiving quantitative replies to the questionnaires, 
                                                 
6  A parallel examination has been conducted concerning the application of this Directive in relation to the 
identification  of  clients  in  non-face  to  face  transactions  and  possible  implications  for  electronic 
commerce. The results of this other examination are presented in a different working document. 
7  The following organisations were contacted: Conference of Notaries of the European Union (CNUE), 
the European Federation of Bar Associations (FBE), the Council of Bar Associations and Law Societies 
of Europe (CCBE), the International Bar Association (IBA), Association of European Lawyers (AEA); 
Union  of  European  Lawyers  (UAE)  and  Society  of  Trust  and  Estate  Practitioners  (STEP).  Where 
relevant, the organisations were invited to disseminate the questionnaires to their national affiliates. 
8  IP/05/1528 of 5 December 2005 
9  Financial Action Task Force. See www.fatf-gafi.org 
10  See www.coe.int/moneyval  
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obtaining qualitative and reliable information on some of the aspects covered by the 
examination was also difficult and, in same cases, was not possible. This will be 
reflected in the relevant parts of the report. 
5.  This document presents the results of this examination regarding: 
•  (section  2)  the  transposition  of  the  Directive  and  the  scope  of  the  national 
implementing legislation; 
•  (section 3) the impact of the Directive on the behaviour of the legal professionals: 
i.e. when entering into a professional relationship with the client, when identifying 
suspicious  transactions  and  reporting  them;  and  in  relation  to  their  internal 
organisation to cope with the obligations of the Directive; 
•  (section 4) the impact of the legislation on the competitive environment of legal 
professionals; 
•  (section  5)  the  effectiveness  of  the  reporting  system  and  the  view  of  the 
stakeholders  as  regards  the  role  of  the  legal  professionals  in  the  fight  against 
money laundering.  
Finally, some conclusions will be provided in section 6.  
2.  THE IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION: TRANSPOSITION AND SCOPE 
6.  This section briefly presents the process leading to the transposition into national 
law,  from  the  formal  perspective,  of  the  obligations  set  out  in  the  Directive  in 
relation to the legal profession (subsection 2.1). It also examines the transposition of 
the personal scope of application of the Directive, and the extent to which Member 
States have extended it (subsection 2.2.). 
2.1.  The transposition process  
7.  The Second Directive required Member States to align their national legislation to its 
requirements by 15 June 2003 at the latest. However, the transposition of the Second 
Directive did not take place within the foreseen deadline. In some cases, the delay 
affected only the legal profession.  
Only  four  (Denmark,  Germany,  Finland  and  the  Netherlands)  out  of  the  then  15 
Member States enacted national transposition measures within the given time limit, 
while  Ireland  and  Spain  did  so  shortly  afterwards.  Following  the  opening  of 
infringement proceedings, Austria, Belgium and the United Kingdom notified the 
Commission of their implementation by the end of 2003. At the beginning of 2004, 
the  Commission  sent  formal  requests  to  Italy,  Portugal,  Greece,  Sweden, 
Luxembourg and France to implement the directive
11. Concerning the 10 Member 
States that joined the Community in May 2004, most either had legislation in place 
by that time (Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak 
Republic,  Slovenia)  or  put  it  in  place  shortly  afterwards  (Czech  Republic  in 
                                                 
11  IP/04/180 of 9 February 2004.  
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September 2004). By mid-2005, the main legislation was (formally)
12 in place in 
almost  all  Member  States,  although  as  regards  the  legal  profession  the  practical 
application of the national rules pursuant to the Directive could not take place in 
some of them (notably Italy), as some decrees developing the law were missing. Italy 
finally  completed  its  legislation  as  regards  the  legal  profession  in  early  2006.  In 
October 2005, the Commission announced that it would take France and Greece to 
court  for  non-communication  of  the  national  implementation  measures
13.  These 
proceedings were eventually withdrawn once these Member States communicated 
the  adoption  of  the  relevant  national  legislation.  Greece  adopted  legislation  in 
December 2005. France did it so in June 2006. 
8.  This has resulted in few Member States having a sufficiently long experience with 
the application of anti-money laundering rules to the legal profession. Indeed, in the 
vast  majority  of  Member  States,  prior  to  the  adoption  of  this  Directive,  legal 
professionals were not subject before to any anti-money laundering obligations
14.  
2.2.  The scope of the implementing legislation: lawyers, notaries and others 
9.  National implementing legislation follows the Directive closely as far as the personal 
scope is concerned. The focus of the Directive's preventative system in relation to the 
independent legal professionals is “activity based”: independent legal professionals 
do not fall within the scope of the Directive in all circumstances, but only when (in 
the  exercise  of  their  professional  activities)  they  carry  out  certain  financial,  real 
estate and corporate related activities
15. For any other activity, lawyers do not fall 
within  the  scope  of  the  Directive,  unless  Member  States  extend  the  Directive 
requirements: this has rarely been done
16.  
However, the drafting technique adopted in the directive, to ensure consistency with 
the existing legislation, was subjective: e.g. identifying professional categories. This 
has been followed in national legislation. In a large number of Member States only 
                                                 
12  This paragraph intends to provide an overview of the timing of adoption of national measures. It does 
not judge on the quality of the national transposition measures. 
13  IP/05/1288 of 17 October 2005.  
14  Prior to the adoption of the Directive, legislation of this kind was only applied to all kinds of legal 
professionals in few Member States, such as in the United Kingdom. However, in some other Member 
States  (Belgium,  France  or  Spain,  for  instance)  notaries  were  already  subject  to  some  anti-money 
laundering rules involving reporting obligations. Indeed, in most countries, notaries used to at least 
identify and verify the identity of their clients.  
15  Cf. Article 2a(5) of the Directive: "[…] when they participate, whether (a) by assisting in the planning 
or execution of transactions for their client concerning the: (i) buying and selling of real property or 
business entities; (ii) managing of client money, securities or other assets; (iii) opening or management 
of bank, savings or securities accounts; (iv) organization of contributions necessary for the creation, 
operation or management of companies; (v) creation, operation or management of trusts, companies or 
similar  structures;  (b)or  by  acting  on  behalf  of  and  for  their  client  in  any  financial  or  real  estate 
transaction." 
16  For  instance,  in  Denmark,  independent  legal  professionals  are  also  subject  to  the  rules  when  they 
provide other kind of business assistance; in Poland (only for notaries) when a transaction exceeds a 
certain amount; in Belgium (only for notaries) for all kind of business, or in the United Kingdom when 
they provide tax advice. It should be noted that national legislation in some countries may also go 
beyond the requirements of the Directive in terms of material scope insofar as it covers the financing of 
terrorism in addition to money laundering, thus anticipating already the implementation of the Third 
Directive.  
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lawyers
17 and notaries
18 are within the categories of independent legal professionals 
subject to the national legislation pursuant to the Directive. Normally lawyers or 
notaries are subject to the law as individual practitioners, independently of whether 
they  practice  alone  or  within  a  law  firm  or  similar  grouping  of  professionals. 
However, in a few countries, law firms are explicitly mentioned as an entity subject 
to the law.  
In some Member States, in addition to lawyers and notaries, other categories of legal 
professionals  are  also  covered
19.  These  regulated  professions  are  often  country 
specific  and  are  not  necessarily  found  in  other  Member  States.  This  report  will 
therefore focus on lawyers and notaries only. 
10.  There are competitors to independent legal professionals in the provision of legal or 
quasi-legal services who remain outside the scope of the Directive. Interventions in 
real  estate  or  financial  transactions  may  be  practiced  by  other  regulated  or 
unregulated professionals, financial institutions or by any duly empowered person in 
the normal exercise of his civil rights, without the need to be qualified as a lawyer or 
notary.  Even  the  planning  or  execution  of  transactions  concerning  the  creation, 
operation or management of trusts, companies or similar structures is not a reserved 
activity for lawyers or notaries. From this perspective, the subjective approach in the 
Directive may create loopholes in the anti-money laundering preventative system in 
cases where these services are provided by persons not subject to the Directive. This 
may also create distortions of competition
20. 
11.  Whilst the way in which independent legal professionals are covered by the different 
national legislation is similar, the extent of their obligations varies in practice from 
country to country. This different treatment derives from other provisions, such as 
the definition of criminal activity giving rise to proceeds (e.g. some Member States, 
such as the United Kingdom, follow an all-crime approach with no de minimis rules); 
the different rules regarding reporting obligations (see below on the  role of self-
                                                 
17  To be understood as the professionals referred to in Article 1(2) of Directive 1998/5/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 to facilitate practice of the profession of lawyer on a 
permanent basis in a Member States other than that in which the qualification was obtained, OJ L77, 
14.3.1998, p. 36. It should be noted that in Ireland, barristers are not subject to the national legislation 
pursuant  to  the  anti-money  laundering  Directive,  only  solicitors  are.  In  the  United  Kingdom,  both 
barristers and solicitors are subject. 
18  The so-called 'Latin' notary profession (sometimes referred to as 'civil law notaries') are independent 
professionals who advise private parties and draft contracts on their instructions, as well as partake in 
the  issuing  of  public  documents,  and  fulfil  quasi  judicial  duties.  They  are  appointed  by  the  state, 
entrusted with public functions and hold a public office. They are not however civil servants and remain 
independent from the state and economically self-reliant. This profession exists in 19 of the 25 Member 
States: all except, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
19  For instance: judicial distrainers (CZ), persons providing consultancy services (EE), procuradores (ES), 
huissiers de justice (BE, FR), avoués (FR), commissaires-priseurs (FR), administrateurs judiciaires 
(FR), mandataires liquidateurs (FR), sociétés de vente volontaires de meubles aux enchères publiques 
(FR), providers of legal services (NL); labour law advisors (IT), solicitadores (PT), executors (SK). 
20  The  need  to  cover  the  whole  range  of  activities  consisting  in  giving  advice  and  assisting  in  the 
conduction of corporate businesses, identified as exposed to misuse for money laundering purposes, led 
the European Community, in line with the FATF Recommendations, to include in the scope of the 
Third anti-money laundering Directive as well the provision of trust and company services by natural or 
legal persons. Such activities, although not included among those whose exercise is reserved to legal 
professionals, are typically carried out also by lawyers, notaries and accountants.  
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regulatory bodies and the tipping off problem); or the sanctions regime (where some 
Member States may be stricter, see below). The differences in the implementation of 
the Directive have related implications for competition in the (mostly cross-border) 
supply of legal services (see section 4).  
3.  IMPACT  OF  THE  LEGISLATION  ON  THE  BEHAVIOUR  OF  INDEPENDENT  LEGAL 
PROFESSIONALS  
12.  For  independent  legal  professionals  (in  particular  lawyers),  the  enactment  of  the 
Directive has resulted in significant changes in the organisation of their professional 
activities. The main impact appears to be in relation to 3 issues: (1) the way they 
enter into a professional relationship with a client; (2) the need to be able to identify 
suspicious transactions and report about them; and (3) the need to adapt their internal 
organization  to  be  able  to  cope  with  the  Directive's  obligations
21.  This  will  be 
examined in the following three subsections. 
3.1.  Entering into a professional relationship with a client: the main difficulties 
13.  According to the Directive, entering into a professional relationship with a client 
requires, in particular, upfront identification of this client by means of supporting 
evidence (which implies a certain verification of his/her/its identity). This subsection 
examines the main impact of this obligation, as implemented at national level, on the 
practitioners.  
14.  Upfront identification of a client
22 is a well established practice for notaries under 
national law. Notaries, in addition, normally participate in "face-to-face" transactions 
only, which facilitates the identification process. From this perspective, notaries have 
not had to substantially alter their behaviour as a result of the application of the 
Directive. This is not, however, necessarily the case for lawyers. In their case, the 
compulsory obligation to identify clients, as defined by the Directive and the national 
legislation, is a relatively new legal obligation. However, the deontological rules in 
some countries already encouraged lawyers to identify their clients, in particular to 
avoid conflicts of interest. In any case, this obligation does not appear to present any 
particular ethical problem for lawyers
23 
15.  According to the legal profession, the implementation of the obligation on lawyers to 
identify the client is not without some practical difficulties (which are not always 
                                                 
21  See  Article  3(1),  (2),  (7)  and  (8)  in  relation  to  the  identification  of  clients  when  entering  into  a 
professional relation; Article 6(1) and (2) in relation to the report (in certain circumstances) of any fact 
that might be an indication of money laundering to the relevant authorities; and Articles 11 and 4 in 
relation to the establishment of adequate procedures of internal control and communication in order to 
forestall and prevent operations related to money laundering, and other adequate supporting measures, 
such as training or record keeping . 
22  However, notaries point out that, in their case, they cannot really refuse clients as they are not in a 
totally normal contractual relationship as a result of their public official duties. 
23  This was recognised by the Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Community as early 
as in 1997, well before the presentation of the proposal for the second anti-money laundering directive. 
The CCBE recommended that the deontological codes of the different Bars and Law Societies require 
the  obligation  to  identify  the  clients.  Voir  the  « Déclaration  de  principe  du  CCBE  sur  le  secret 
professionnel des avocats et la législation sur le blanchiment d’argent », adopted at the 14/15 November 
1997 CCBE Plenary Meeting.  
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lawyer-specific)
24. Some of the difficulties apply both at a purely national level and 
at the cross-border level:  
•  (i) Choosing the right time for the identification of new clients present difficulties 
if it turns out only after the first meeting with the new client that the latter seeks to 
participate in transactions covered by the Directive, in which case lawyers would 
have to revert to such clients to obtain the necessary documentation. In practice 
lawyers  tend  to  solve  this  problem  by  conducting  due  diligence  in  all  cases, 
irrespective of whether the legal service falls under the Directive or not. In this 
context,  it  is  underlined  that  prospective  clients  do  not  necessarily  respond 
favourably to being asked for identification details (in some countries there is 
some cultural resistance), are slow to send the required information or provide 
incorrect  documents  (e.g.  uncertified  copies  of  requested  documents),  which 
delays the process and therefore the initiation of the provision of the legal service. 
As a possible solution, some elements of the legal profession claim that, given 
their advisory role and the on-going relationship they develop with their clients 
(contrary  to  the  transaction-based  approach  prevailing  in  the  financial  sector), 
there is possibly a case for lighter rules on customer due diligence at the initial 
stages of the relationship. The need for the identification of current clients (who 
may have had a close and continuous relationship with the professional) has also 
been put into question. 
•  (ii) A particular practical difficulty appears when the client is introduced to the 
law practitioner by other professionals (e.g. tax advisers) to provide legal services 
to their clients in circumstances where such client will become a client of the 
lawyer. The second Directive did not provide a reply to this problem. In such 
circumstances it may be difficult to obtain identification materials directly from 
such clients. This difficulty also applies to the relationships between barristers and 
solicitors in the United Kingdom. Even where the "introducer" is also subject to 
the  obligations  of  the  directive,  it  is  not  always  possible  to  obtain  written 
confirmation from this professional confirming that he has taken all reasonable 
steps to identify the client and that he holds the relevant identification papers on 
file (i.e. where the other designated body has been acting for the client prior to the 
introduction of the anti-money laundering regime). This difficulty also applies in 
the case of cross-border referrals, even within the same law firm. In this context, 
part  of  the  legal  profession  hopes  that  these  difficulties  could  be  overcome 
through the transposition by Member States of Article 14 (and subsequent) of the 
Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive. 
Box n° 1 – Example of difficulties relating to cross-border referrals within the same law firm 
Law firm A in country B has had its national central bank as a client for many years. In the absence of 
grandfathering rights or a list of low risk bodies exempted from identification requirements, Law firm 
A's office in country C was compelled by its own local regulations to take all the necessary steps to 
verify  the  identity  of  the  national  central  bank  of  country  B.  Given  the  usual  long-standing 
relationships lawyers have with their clients, such a requirement leads to acute embarrassment for 
members of the legal profession. 
                                                 
24  Around half of the (few) respondents to the on-line consultation declared having faced difficulties in the 
application of this obligation.   
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•  (iii) Verifying the identity of beneficial owners (although strictly speaking not 
required by the Second Directive) and obtaining information on the origin of the 
funds  are  underlined  (also  by  notaries)  as  not  always  easy  tasks,  whether  at 
national or at cross border level (see also the following paragraph). Obtaining 
information on beneficial owners (in particular trusts) is not always easy, unless 
the  client  cooperates,  and  publicly  available  information  exits.  Doing  so  in  a 
timely manner is difficult in all cases. 
•  (iv)  The  impact  of  identity  fraud/theft  has  been  raised  in  some  countries 
(especially the United Kingdom) as an increasing problem for the identification of 
the  client,  leading  in  some  cases  to  legal  practitioners  purchasing  electronic 
identity verification systems (although their reliability may be uncertain) in order 
to  fulfil  their  obligations.  Identity  fraud/theft,  however,  is  not  induced  by  the 
Directive rules. On the contrary, the Directive provides an indirect useful tool to 
fight against this phenomenon. 
16.  Other practical difficulties are of an almost purely cross-border nature.  
•  (i)  Difficulties  (also  for  notaries)  in  respect  of  documentary  evidence
25.  The 
principal issue that practitioners have encountered in dealing with non-resident 
clients (whether within the EU or from a third Country) is that of determining 
what constitutes the “relevant documentation” to be provided as a result of the 
differing national transposition of the Directive. In some cases, the Member State 
of the practitioner may require certain specific documents to prove the identity of 
the client, irrespective of whether those documents exist or are routinely available 
in the client's country of origin. Furthermore, in the case where the client has 
already been identified in his own country by another practitioner or branch of the 
law  firm,  if  the  type  of  documents  to  be  produced  differs  from  those  of  the 
country of origin of the client, this will imply additional delays for the law firm in 
the dealings with that client (e.g. if the identification is not complete, many law 
firms  do  not  allow  practitioners  to  undertake  any  work  or  open  a  file). 
International law firms claim that the existence of different requirements makes it 
difficult to have a single pan-European client-acceptance policy and that at the 
end of the day, the more demanding legislation sets the standard.  
•  (ii) The difficulties in obtaining documentation also arise in the case where the 
client  is  a  corporate  vehicle  from  a  different  country:  where  there  is  no  trade 
register,  then  a  lawyer's  statement  is  needed,  which  implies  costs  and  timing 
problems)
26. The evidence of existence of the company may merely be a reference 
to a Chamber of Commerce  register,  and if a trade register exists, it may not 
certify the information it provides. In these cases, such documents might not be 
enough  to  meet  the  minimum  legal  requirements  of  the  Member  State  of  the 
practitioner. It has been highlighted to the Commission that particular problems 
arise in the dealings with clients from so-called tax havens. It has been underlined 
that this problem is likely to become even more important in the light of the new 
                                                 
25  According to the few replies to the on-line consultation, around two thirds of the difficulties in this area 
are related to cross-border issues.  
26  For instance, there is no trade register in the US. Requesting legal opinion from US counsel is very 
costly and cannot be done on an overnight basis  
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requirements of the Third Anti-Money Directive in relation to the identification of 
the beneficial owners. The translation problem has also been underlined. 
•  (iii) Practitioners also underline that cross-border problems are generated by the 
different speed in the transposition of the Directive by Member States (i.e. rules 
being applicable in some countries, but not in others) and also by the lack of level 
playing field (more severe requirements in some countries than in others). The 
implementation  of  the  rules  in  some  countries  is  perceived  as  being  more 
bureaucratic than in others. The legal profession calls for Member States to take 
into account cross-border situations when transposing the obligations under the 
directive  into  national  law,  to  implement  in  a  timely  manner,  and  for  the 
Commission to monitor this process. 
17.  Although the identification of the client is straightforward in the vast majority of 
cases, practical difficulties of this kind, when they arise, are considered by the legal 
profession as a waste of energy and goodwill, and may lead to a focus on formalistic 
procedures (also because of fear of sanctions) or a refusal of service, rather than to 
taking important steps to forestall criminal access to the financial system.  
3.2.  Identifying suspicious transactions and reporting about them 
18.  The  obligation  to  identify  transactions  suspected  of  being  related  to  money 
laundering  and  reporting  them  to  the  authorities constitutes  the  major  innovation 
resulting from the application of the Directive as regards the legal profession. In the 
first place, this obligation affects the relationship between the lawyer and the client. 
The  changes  to  this  relationship  will  be  briefly  described  in  subsection  3.2.1. 
Secondly,  the  reporting  obligation  has  created  in  some  cases  a  new  role  in  the 
reporting  process  for  the  self-regulatory  bodies,  to  which  lawyers  and  notaries 
belong.  This  new  role  and  the  consequences  that  it  entails,  notably  the  duty  to 
cooperate  with  the  public  authorities  in  the  reporting  process,  are  examined  in 
subsection 3.2.2. The difficulties in the application of the reporting obligation will be 
examined in section 5 (effectiveness of the reporting process). 
3.2.1.  The reporting obligation and the relationship with the client 
19.  The  reporting  obligation  is  the  most  controversial  element  of  the  Directive,  in 
particular  from  the  lawyers'  perspective,  as  it  has  an  important  impact  in  the 
relationship  between  the  legal  professional  and  his/her  client.  Lawyers  (and  also 
notaries) are no longer "safe harbours" for clients as the information they transmit to 
the  legal  professional  in  the  context  of  their  professional  relationship  may  be 
disclosed to the public authorities in certain circumstances. This is a radical change 
to the principle of confidentiality that the legal profession has traditionally observed. 
This  breach  of  confidentiality  has  a  certain  impact  on  the  relationship  of  trust 
between legal professionals and their clients. Indeed, many legal professionals feel 
obliged to inform their clients in their first meeting or prospective clients in their 
privacy statements about this reporting obligation. 
20.  The reporting obligation is, however, not an absolute one. All Member States have 
opted  for  the  flexibility  provided  in  the  Directive  to  exempt  lawyers  from  the  
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reporting obligation in the situations subject to legal privilege in relation to litigation 
(as defined in the Directive)
27. In this way, the core of the legal profession is still 
safeguarded from intrusion from the authorities
28. The legal privilege exemption is 
also extended to notaries in most cases, at least partially (i.e. for some parts of their 
activity), but not in all Member States, as the activity related to litigation may not be 
conducted by notaries in those cases. 
The legal privilege is normally regulated by law or regulation (and in some cases it is 
directly  guaranteed  in  the  national  constitutions),  as  it  is  considered  part  of  the 
fundamental freedoms that citizens enjoy
29. In some countries, specific legislation on 
professional  secrecy  has  been  developed.  The  legal  privilege  exception  for  the 
purposes  of  the  anti-money  laundering  legislation  is  normally  regulated  either 
directly by that legislation (e.g. providing that its obligations do not apply in that 
particular  case)  or  through  other  means  (e.g.  a  provision  in  the  criminal  code 
indicating  that  non-respect  of  professional  secrecy  would  qualify  as  a  criminal 
offence), or both. In some cases this legislation is supplemented by ethical standards 
prepared by the professionals. In common law countries, case law appears to be very 
important in defining the boundaries of the legal privilege
30, and indeed, one country 
(Ireland) seems to rely exclusively on case law and ethical standards. 
21.  In spite of the legal privilege exemption that waives the obligation to report in certain 
specific circumstances, lawyers (more than notaries) believe that this obligation is 
disproportionate. Since the process leading to the adoption of Directive 2001/97/EC 
began, they have repeatedly expressed the view that the reporting obligation runs 
contrary to the essence of the profession and presents ethical problems. Indeed, they 
consider that the reporting obligation is in conflict with the fundamental rights of the 
EU citizens to consult a lawyer in full confidentiality, without the lawyer reporting 
on them to government authorities
31. They consider that this has a negative impact on 
the citizen's access to justice. As a result, they are of the view that the reporting 
obligation should be removed (see also section 5.5). 
                                                 
27  E.g. with regard to information they receive from or obtain on one of their clients, in the course of 
ascertaining the legal position for their client or performing their task of defending or representing that 
client in, or concerning judicial proceedings, including advice on institution or avoiding proceedings 
(most of the Member States seem to directly transpose the language of the Directive). 
  The  legal  privilege  exemption  normally  extends  to  the  communication  between  client  and  legal 
professional in the circumstances foreseen in the Directive, but cannot cover the communications done 
for the purposes of committing a prescribed offence or if keeping the secrecy would result in making 
the independent legal professional an accessory/accomplice of the client under criminal law. It does not 
apply either if the legal professional knows that the client is deliberately using the legal advice for the 
purposes of money laundering. 
28  It is noted that for many lawyers, litigation is not part of their main activity.  
29  In some countries the client can free the independent legal professional in part or completely from his 
confidentiality obligation. In other countries, however, keeping the professional secrecy is a public 
order obligation.  
30  Indeed, in the United Kingdom a recent case (Bowman v Fels, 2005 EWCA Civ 226) clarified the 
application of the legal privilege in relation to the money laundering offences in the law, which was 
ambiguous on this issue. 
31  For instance, in February 2005, the European Bar Presidents, on the occasion of the 33
rd Conference of 
Presidents  of  the  Bars  and  Law  Societies  signed  an  open  letter  to  the  European  Commission,  the 
European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. The Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe 
(CCBE) has also publicly expressed this view several times.  
EN  13    EN 
In this context, the Belgian and the Polish Bar Associations have both instituted legal 
challenges on constitutional grounds before their respective national jurisdictions. 
The Belgian Constitutional Court recently filed a request for a preliminary ruling 
with the European Court of Justice (case C-305/05) on the compatibility of directive 
2001/97/EC with Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, and, as a consequence, Article 6(2) of the of the Treaty on 
European Union. The European Court of Justice has not yet adopted a decision in 
this case. 
Moreover,  a  Petition  was  presented  before  the  European  Parliament  in  2003  in 
connection with the Directive 2001/97/EC
32. This petition was declared admissible 
on 12 January 2004, but no formal position on it has been taken by the Parliament
33. 
3.2.2.  The  channels  for  reporting:  the  role  of  the  self-regulatory  bodies  and  of  the 
authorities 
22.  The reporting obligation has also resulted in important changes for the role of some 
professional  associations  (so-called  self-regulatory  bodies).  The  self-regulatory 
bodies, whose membership is compulsory for the independent practitioners have, in 
some Member States, been given a role to play in the reporting system by national 
law
34.  These  bodies,  instead  of  the  financial  intelligence  units  (FIU),  have  been 
appointed as the first authority to be informed by practitioners of facts that might be 
an  indication  of  money  laundering.  This  appointment  has  been  either  for  both 
notaries and lawyers (as in the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Poland
35), only 
for lawyers (Belgium, Denmark, France, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal
36) or only 
for notaries (Spain
37).  
                                                 
32  Petition 693/2003 by Paul-Albert Iweins (French), on behalf of the Paris Bar, the National Bar Council 
and the Conference of Chairmen of the Bar, bearing 2 signatures, on new Community legislation on the 
prevention of the  use of the financial system  for the purpose of  money  laundering.  The petitioner 
objects to this Directive, arguing that it contradicts the case law recently established by the Court of 
Justice and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. Were it put into practice, the 
directive would undermine the relationship between a lawyer and his client, effectively requiring the 
lawyer to become an informer and to act on behalf of the State. 
33  The Commission provided a written contribution to the Petitions Committee on 19 May 2004. In its 
meeting of 17 January 2005, the Petitions Committee left the petition open, waiting for the achievement 
of the co-decision procedure leading to the adoption of the 3rd Directive. Since then, this Committee 
has not taken a position on the petition. Nevertheless, in its report on the proposal for a 3rd Directive 
(draftsperson, Ms. Sbarbati) adopted on 27 January 2005, this Committee, further to the presentation of 
draft amendments to the text, requested the withdrawal of the proposal for a 3rd Directive and the 
preparation of the examination on the application of the 2nd Directive. 
34  This is a faculty provided for in Article 6(3) of the Directive, but not an obligation. 
35  Czech Republic: the Czech Bar Association (www.cak.cz); the Civil Law Notaries Chamber. Germany: 
for lawyers, the regional councils of bars, for notaries, the regional chambers of notaries. In addition, 
there  is  a  Federal  Council  of  Bars  and  a  Federal  Chamber  of  Notaries.  Hungary:  the  regional  bar 
associations and the regional chambers of notaries. Poland: there is a self-regulatory body for lawyers 
and another one for notaries. Both are divided into regional bodies. 
36  Belgium:  the  president  ("bâtonnier  de  l'ordre")  of  the  regional  bar  to  which  the  lawyer  belongs. 
Denmark: Danish Bar and Law Society. France: for lawyers, the president ("bâtonnier de l'ordre") of the 
regional  bar  to  which  the  lawyer  belongs,  for  "avoués",  the  president  of  the  regional  chamber 
("compagnie") to which the "avoué" belongs", for the lawyers admitted at the "Conseil d'État" and the 
"Cour de Cassation", the president of the bar grouping this kind of lawyers. In addition, there is a 
national  bar  council  and  a  national  chamber  of  "avoués".  Lithuania:  Lithuanian  Bar  Association.  
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Nevertheless,  in  the  majority  of  Member  States  independent  legal  professionals 
should report directly to the public authorities (Austria, Cyprus
38, Estonia, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom). 
Box n°2 – The self-regulatory body of the Spanish notaries 
The case of notaries in Spain presents many particularities. Since December 2005, an ad hoc body 
within the self-regulatory body has been created by legislation. The so-called "Centralised Body for 
the Prevention of Money Laundering for Notaries" (OCP
39) is composed of two units: (i) the analysis 
and reporting unit and (ii) the procedures and training unit. The task of the first unit is to analyse 
transactions  captured  from  a  unified  database  (in  which  the  details  of  all  transactions  involving 
Spanish notaries are recorded) or sent directly by the notaries and to determine those which are to be 
sent to the FIU or the competent authority. The second unit is charged with the duty to elaborate the 
procedures  to  fulfil  the  range  of  obligations  by  a  notary  and  assist  him/her  in  understanding  the 
regime, provide them with examples of suspicious transactions, risk factors and adequate training. The 
OCP's  methodology  is  based  on:  (i)  its  technological  capability  to  obtain  information  from  the 
integrated database (unified index or Índice Único Informatizado) on risk transactions and to raise red 
flags  whenever  these  risk  transactions  take  place  in  front  of  one  or  more  Notaries
40;  (ii)  the 
involvement of the notaries in reporting immediately to the OCP those transactions featuring several 
risk parameters before or immediately after the intervention, so that it can be analysed on a urgent 
basis and eventually delivered to the FIU or the competent Authority; and (iii) the capability of the 
OCP to interact with the notary in order to get additional information on the analysed transactions, 
with a view to substantially enriching the reports sent on. It is compulsory for the Notary to join the 
OCP and to grant access to all the information included in the unified index. 
23.  As mandated by the Directive, Member States have established "appropriate forms of 
co-operation" between the designated self-regulatory bodies (those with powers in 
the reporting process) and the relevant authorities responsible for combating money 
laundering.  
24.  This relates in the first place to the forwarding of the reports. Subject to the filtering 
activity (see below), the self regulatory body should forward the information to the 
authorities,  and  in  a  few  cases  it  has  been  made  explicit  that  this  transfer  of 
information should take place within a given deadline after receipt of the suspicious 
transaction  report  (e.g.  in  Lithuania,  the  Bar  Association  must  forward  the 
information to the FIU within 3 working hours after receipt of the report).  
In  this  context,  an  issue  of  particular  concern  for  the  legal  profession  is  the 
possibility of the self-regulatory bodies to act as a filter in the reporting system: i.e. 
to transfer to the authorities the information it deems necessary after conducting an 
assessment  of  the  information  it  receives  from  the  legal  practitioner,  but  not 
necessarily all the information disclosed in the first place by the practitioner. The 
rationale behind the filtering activity is to block the reports in case the practitioner 
would  infringe  the  legal  privilege  principle  by  providing  information  concerning 
                                                                                                                                                         
Luxembourg: the president ("bâtonnier de l'ordre") of the regional bar to which the lawyer belongs. 
Portugal: "Ordem dos advogados" (and "Ordem dos solicitadores" for "solicitadores"). 
37  Spain: "Consejo General del notariado". In Spain, lawyers should report directly to the authorities. 
38  In Cyprus, the Council of the Cyprus Bar was appointed as supervisory body for lawyers, but the 
reports are done directly to the FIU. 
39  "Organo centralizado de prevención del blanqueo" 
40  It improves the traditional situation where an individual Notary had only partial information on a legal 
or physical person.  
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proceedings.  In  roughly  half  of  the  Member  States  that  give  the  self-regulatory 
bodies a role to play in the reporting process, those bodies are not allowed to act as a 
filter and should forward the relevant reports to the relevant authorities. However, 
the  filtering  practice  is  formally  accepted  in  a  few  Member  States  (the  Czech 
Republic, Denmark, France, Portugal or Spain). It is noted that, in some countries 
(for  example,  in  Germany  and  the  Czech  Republic),  the  self-regulatory  body, 
regardless  of  any  filtering  role,  may  send  to  the  authorities  comments  on  the 
suspicious transaction reports they are transmitting. In any case, the filtering role is 
considered  as  a  hypothetical  situation  by  many  stakeholders  and  has  rarely  been 
fulfilled in practice. 
Box n°3 – Self-regulatory bodies acting as filter in the reporting system: examples.  
National  legislation  provides  in  some  cases  for  wider  powers  for  the  self-regulatory  body.  For 
example, in France, the law foresees that the self-regulatory body concerned may not forward the 
reports received from the lawyers to the FIU if the body considers that there is no suspicion of money 
laundering. In such a case, the body in question should inform the lawyers at the origin of the report of 
the reasons why the report has not been forwarded to the FIU and should also inform the president of 
the national bar council (or the president of the national chamber of "avoués") of the situation (but 
without transmitting information allowing for the identification of the persons involved). Then, the 
president of the national bar council, the president of the bar for the lawyers at the "Conseil d'État" 
and the "Cour de cassation", or the president of the national chamber of "avoués" should inform the 
Minister  of  Justice  on  a  periodical  basis  of  the  reports  received  that  resulted  in  information  not 
transmitted to the FIU. The FIU should be informed by the Minister of Justice. 
The case of the notaries in Spain is different. While the self-regulatory body can act as a filter in the 
reporting  system,  it  can  also  act  as  ex-officio  reporter  because  of  its  access  to  all  details  on  all 
transactions carried out by the Spanish notaries, regardless of whether the notary concerned qualifies a 
transaction as suspicious. 
25.  In addition to this filtering role, a sensitive question relates to the power to request 
the legal professional to make further information available. This power generally 
rests with the authorities, but not with the self-regulatory body, except in a few cases 
(e.g. Czech Republic, France, Lithuania and Spain – for notaries only). In Hungary, 
the  authorities'  requests  are  transmitted  to  the  practitioners  through  the  self-
regulatory bodies as a courtesy.  
26.  Finally, other forms of co-operation established often relate to working groups or 
liaison committees between the authorities and the professions (and, in some cases, 
the financial sector)
41. 
Box n°4 – Cooperation between the self regulatory bodies and the authorities: examples. 
In France, the law provides for an anti-money laundering liaison committee, chaired by the Ministry 
of Justice and the FIU, to structure discussions with the financial sector and the professionals subject 
to the law. In Germany, a discussion working group chaired by the FIU with representatives of the 
self-regulatory bodies of the lawyers, notaries and other regulated professions has been created.  
                                                 
41  This kind of working groups have also been created in countries that gave no formal role to the self-
regulatory bodies in the reporting system, as in the Netherlands or Latvia.   
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3.3.  Adaptation of the internal organisation to cope with the obligations 
27.  Legal professionals also need to establish internal procedures and adopt supporting 
measures in order to adapt to the Directive obligations. This subsection will examine 
how this obligation has been implemented in relation to the procedures of internal 
control and communication, internal training and record keeping. A particular focus 
will be put on the difficulties faced by the legal profession. It must be underlined in 
this context that establishing internal procedures and adopting supporting measures, 
as  such,  does  not  appear  to  present  ethical  problems,  but  may  create  an 
administrative burden or increase the costs for the legal profession (see also section 
4).  
28.  In  the  vast  majority  of  Member  States,  independent  legal professionals  generally 
have  an  obligation  to  adopt  their  own  procedures  of  internal  control  and 
communication in order to deal with the risks related to money laundering
42. This 
obligation is implemented differently, depending on the type of professional involved 
and the working environment
43.  
Due to the fact that the work of legal professionals is not based on division of labour 
as is the case for credit and financial institutions, these procedures tend to focus on 
the  duty  of  the  professional  itself  to  be  familiar  with  the  obligations  to  prevent 
money  laundering  and  in  particular  to  be  familiar  with  the  typologies  of  money 
laundering and the facts that might be an indication for money laundering. This is in 
particular the case for notaries (that generally extend the written procedures, where 
they exist, to their clerks and support staff) and, to a lesser extent, for individual 
lawyers. Indeed, the latter are less likely to apply this kind of procedures in practice, 
as  in  most  cases  they  would  work  alone  (and  bear  the  responsibility  to  report 
individually) and their support staff would be very limited. Indeed, in some countries 
(e.g. France), the obligations to apply this kind of procedures internally only apply to 
firms.  
As far as law firms are concerned, division of labour is more common in larger firms 
and therefore specific procedures of internal control and communication are easier to 
implement,  in  particular  by  law  firms  having  international  activities.  Ease  of 
implementation does not necessarily mean lack of or low costs as, depending of the 
solutions chosen (e.g. use of commercial automated systems for verifying identities), 
the cost can be high. Some countries (e.g. Germany, Hungary) impose the obligation 
to apply this kind of procedures for law firms/partnerships above 10 professionals. 
Smaller firms (similarly to individual lawyers) have a tendency to adapt or develop 
their existing procedures aiming at avoiding conflict of interest with their clients (e.g. 
clients and opponents checks) to cover money laundering issues too. These kinds of 
internal  procedures  are  generally  limited  to  the  persons  directly  dealing  with  the 
transactions referred to in Article 2a(5) of the Directive, which almost always mean 
the independent legal professional only, but not the support staff.  Only in a  few 
Member  States  (Denmark,  Ireland,  the  Netherlands,  Spain,  United  Kingdom)  are 
                                                 
42  In the Czech Republic the law excludes legal professionals from this obligation, although it obliges 
them to provide training to their staff. 
43  In some cases, practitioners and law firms may follow the guidelines issued by their respective self-
regulatory body but this does not appear to be the general rule.  
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employees  made  aware,  as  a  matter  of  general  practice,  of  the  policies  and 
procedures in place in their law firm to prevent money laundering. 
Box n°5 – Examples of internal control and communication procedures. Compliance officers/ 
Money Laundering reporting officers.  
Procedures  of  internal  control  in  law  firms  could  for  instance  involve  obtaining  access  to 
commercial automated systems for verification of identities, the establishment of computerised client 
management systems (e.g. a new client file cannot be opened until such time as verification of identity 
has  been  carried  out),  centralised  client  vetting  by  compliance  department,  the  use  of  standard 
questionnaires for gathering information from the client on the origin of funds or the definition of 
thresholds  for  acceptance  of  cash  from  clients.  They  can  as  well  consist  in  setting  out  internal 
reporting  procedures  or  in  conducting  internal  audits.  In  this  context,  compliance  officers  (also 
referred to as money laundering reporting officers – MLRO) with responsibility for receiving money 
laundering reports internally and liaising with the authorities in cases where a report must be made 
seem to be appointed in a limited number of countries and mostly in large law firms. In Ireland, the 
Law Society strongly recommends appointing a MLRO to whom all solicitors and employees should 
report suspicious transactions. In the United Kingdom appointing a MLRO is a statutory obligation for 
law firms. The MLRO is personally liable and can face up to 5 years imprisonment if he fails to report 
knowledge or suspicion of money laundering to the FIU. In Germany, appointing a compliance officer 
is compulsory for law firms/partnerships above 10 professionals and in Slovenia for law firms above 4 
professionals. Cypriot lawyers are obliged to appoint a MLRO to whom reports are made internally 
and who should report to the FIU. 
Procedures of internal control for notaries: In Luxembourg, the notaries' self-regulatory body has 
set  up  a  database  containing  updated  lists  of  identified  money  launderers  and  terrorist  financers. 
Notaries are connected through a secured line and conduct searches in the database when identifying 
clients.  
Procedures  of  communication  could  consist  of  internal  memos  dealing  with  indicators  for  the 
determination of whether a transaction is suspicious, indicating the type of documents which can be 
accepted for the identification of the client, indicating where to find more information etc. 
29.  Small law firms do not generally conduct internal training for their members on this 
issue.  The  situation  is  similar  for  notaries  and  individual  lawyers  for  their  staff. 
Members (and other employees) rather generally benefit from training provided by 
self-regulatory bodies or the authorities (see section 5.2, below). This approach, in 
addition to facilitating the reduction of costs, helps in ensuring a similar level of 
quality of the content of the training actions. Practitioners and supporting staff are 
generally only provided training internally in really large firms or where compliance 
officers exist, although this practice seems to vary from country to country. Internal 
training seems to be more frequent in Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom. 
Box n°6 – Internal training: example 
In  the  United  Kingdom,  the  provision  of  training  is  an  obligation  under  the  Money  Laundering 
Regulations in respect of a number of areas, including how to recognise and deal with transactions 
which may be related to money laundering. The Law Society’s Money Laundering Guidance provides 
firms with information that should guide the implementation of their own money laundering training 
policies. The legal requirements for law firms are that “relevant employees” must receive training and 
legal professionals are clearly covered by this definition. Members of a firm’s accounts department, 
who handle funds, generally receive money laundering training as well. The Law Society’s guidance 
provides that different levels of training are required for different staff. The guidance also advises that 
the majority of staff who deal with transactions which are at risk of money laundering need to have 
some understanding of the provisions. Training may be conducted by using a combination of several 
tools, including guidance notes, staff manuals, face-to-face learning, electronic learning resources,  
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video presentations and written tests. Providing training for staff is a protection for the firm in the 
United Kingdom because under the Proceeds of Crime Act an employee has a defence to a charge of 
failure to disclose knowledge or suspicion of  money laundering, if the employer did not provide 
adequate training. 
30.  Further to record keeping, which is mandatory, no other supporting measures are 
adopted  by  legal  professionals,  not  least  because  of  the  cost  of  compliance  with 
existing  obligations,  which  also  includes  the  need  to  respect  data  protection 
legislation. In some cases, in particular in relation to larger law firms or notaries, 
record  keeping  may  imply  upgrading  computer  systems  to  deal  with  the  new 
requirements  (e.g.  scanning  systems  etc.).  In  other  cases,  record  keeping  has 
appeared as a new burden (increasing cost) to an existing practice (verification of 
identity): for example, notaries in Spain used to note down in the official papers the 
type and number of the document used for identification purposes without keeping a 
copy of the document used, which they must do now.  
31.  In general, it is not an easy task for the legal profession to get organised in order to 
fully comply with the anti-money laundering regime, which is perceived as not being 
part  of  the  core,  normal  activity  of  the  functions  they  perform.  The  common 
perception of the stakeholders is that large firms are in a better position than small 
firms or individual practitioners to establish the best way to fulfil their obligations 
under  the  directive.  As  a  result,  it  is  tougher  for  small  firms  or  individual 
practitioners to define (and update) the right procedures. Indeed, it takes time to get 
adapted to the new rules and also to fit some obligations to the legal profession in an 
efficient  way.  It  is  also  considered  costly.  Establishing  procedures  for  the 
identification of clients (and related record keeping) and training schemes (where this 
is compulsory) are considered to be the most resource-intensive. In large firms, many 
resources  are  also  used  in  taking  decisions  on  whether  to  make  reports  to  the 
authorities and giving guidance to staff. Moreover, any change to the rules implies 
the adaptation of the procedures which causes further administrative burden and cost. 
Overall,  only  in  some  Member  States  did  stakeholders  (usually  public 
administrations and notaries) perceive that the directive was easily applied. In the 
majority of cases, the role of self-regulatory bodies has been important in facilitating 
the application of the Directive (see section 5.2, below). 
4.  IMPACT  OF  THE  LEGISLATION  ON  THE  COMPETITIVE  ENVIRONMENT  OF  THE 
INDEPENDENT LEGAL PROFESSIONALS
44 
32.  The application of the Directive may also have a direct or indirect impact on the 
competitive  position  of  lawyers  vis-à-vis  other  professionals  providing  legal  or 
quasi-legal services. This section provides a brief attempt to examine (i) the cost of 
the requirements of the Directive; (ii) whether  there has been any impact on the 
demand  for  the  services  of  lawyers  and  notaries;  (iii)  whether  the  impact  of  the 
Directive  has  been  circumvented  by  money  launderers  by  using  other  means  to 
obtain  legal  advice;  and  finally,  (iv)  whether  lawyers  or  notaries  benefit  from 
competitive advantages compared to tax advisors, external accountants and auditors.  
                                                 
44  Generally on the competitive situation of the legal profession, see the Commission's communication of 
5 September 2005 on "Professional Services – Scope for more reform", document COM(2005)405; 
IP/05/1089.  
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33.  (i) Complying with the anti-money laundering legislation implies a certain cost for 
independent legal professionals, which is not easy to estimate. First, an important 
cost  factor  relates  to  the  performance  of  the  customer  due  diligence  procedures, 
although this depends very much on the profile of the customer (e.g. higher costs if 
non-face-to-face non-resident customer, high costs in relation to the identification of 
beneficial  owners  etc).  This  cost,  however,  will  normally  be  passed  on  to  the 
customer,  thus  increasing  the  cost  of  the  service.  The  cost  of  reporting  is  also 
underlined by the profession. Secondly, independent legal professionals also have 
some general non-customer related costs (also referred to as 'hidden costs' by the 
profession), either at the initial stages of the application of the legislation (e.g. setting 
up of procedures of internal control and communication, designing training schemes, 
investing in equipment etc.), or on an ongoing basis (e.g. the actual provision of 
training, the cost of administrative burden, compliance & reporting officers, the need 
for  additional  staff  etc)
45.  These  costs  are  difficult  to  evaluate  because  of  the 
significant differences between independent legal professionals in terms of working 
structures (e.g. from totally independent professionals to large law firms with dozens 
of lawyers) or in terms of activity (e.g. specialised lawyers or notaries) and also 
because the accounting data is not adapted to calculate these costs. Indeed, most 
stakeholders do not have reliable information on this issue. In any case, they are of 
the view that the cost issue constitutes a barrier for smaller law firms or individual 
practitioners. 
34.  (ii) The entry into force of the national legislation pursuant to the Directive does not 
seem to have had any significant or measurable impact on the demand for services of 
independent legal professionals, or such an impact has not been measured. However, 
for a few stakeholders, the application of the directive would have resulted in an 
increase  of  demand  because  of  customers  requesting  advice  on  anti-money 
laundering  legislation,  although  this  would  relate  only  to  a  small  proportion  of 
practitioners.  
On the contrary, practitioners claim that the Directive had some impact on "lawyer to 
lawyer"  competition.  As  a  result  of  more  stringent  national  rules  (sometimes 
perceived  as  "gold  plating"),  the  attractiveness  of  law  firms  established  in  those 
countries (notably the United Kingdom) diminishes for sophisticated international 
clients. In addition, some practitioners are of the view that others are lazy in applying 
the rules, in order to "satisfy" clients and therefore obtain competitive advantages. 
Part of the legal profession has also signalled that the competitiveness of the EU 
legal  services  industry  vis-à-vis  third  country  practitioners  suffers  from  the 
application  of  the  EU  directive,  in  particular  compared  to  the  regulations  in 
Switzerland,  Canada  and  the  US.  The  legal  profession  warns  about  the  risk  of 
possible regulatory arbitrage, which should be avoided. 
35.  (iii) No circumvention of the rules of the Directive has been identified. Indeed, the 
application of the directive has not resulted in any significant impact on the demand 
for the services of individuals or entities which are not subject to the Directive, but 
                                                 
45  Some  stakeholders  underline  the  costs  in  relation  to  setting  up  electronic  databases  with  customer 
information  or  to  acceding  databases  (e.g.  a  secure  line  to  accede  a  database  containing  names  of 
terrorist financers held by the self-regulatory body). Some stakeholders claim that the cost of training is 
not important at this stage as some public authorities provide free of charge training schemes.  
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are nevertheless able to provide legal or quasi legal services in competition with 
independent legal professionals
46. In particular, it has not been proved that customers 
avail of the services of these individuals or entities with a view to circumvent the 
rules of the directive.  
36.  (iv) Legal professions do not seem to benefit from competitive advantages compared 
to  other  regulated  professions.  It  had  been  claimed  that  the  Directive  creates 
competitive advantages for lawyers compared to other professionals (in particular tax 
advisors) resulting from the scope of application of its rules: in certain circumstances 
for lawyers, in all cases for tax advisors and other regulated professionals
47. Indeed, 
regulated  professions  other  than  lawyers  or  notaries  are  also  subject  to  high 
deontological  standards,  including  strict  rules  on  confidentiality  and  professional 
secrecy
48.  This  view  is,  however,  supported  by  very  few  stakeholders.  The  legal 
profession  in  particular  considers  that  its  specific  professional  duties  and  ethical 
obligations  place  it  in  a  different  situation  to  other  professionals
49.  Furthermore, 
according to stakeholders, in practice, there are no such competitive advantages: in 
the case of the provision of tax advice, there seems to be little demand for sole tax 
                                                 
46  In a few Member States, professionals that are not subject to the Directive provide legal or quasi-legal 
services in competition with independent legal professionals, such as: "legalisatoren" in certain areas of 
Austria that have the power of authenticating sales of real property and act in competition with lawyers 
in  certain  rural  districts  or  divorce  consultancy  services  operated  by  non-lawyers  in  Ireland. 
Additionally, there are trade unions, associations, not-for-profit organisations etc. that provide legal 
advice and help with the preparation of transactions for their members (although they do not represent 
them). In some cases persons with law studies but not registered with a Bar association are mentioned 
as possible providers of services. 
47  In a recent opinion, the European Economic and Social Committee considered that it is unclear why the 
applicability of the directive to notaries and other independent legal professions is restricted to certain 
activities, while other liberal professions, with equivalent high standards of ethical and competence 
standards enforced on their membership, have all their services included. While the Committee has 
some understanding for excluding from the scope of the directive the activities reserved by law to legal 
professionals, the Committee believes that legal professionals should be included within the scope of 
the directive wherever the activities in which they are engaged are not reserved to legal professionals, 
and  the  services  would  be  included  within  the  scope  of  the  Directive  if  carried  out  by  any  other 
appropriately regulated professional firm. In particular, the Committee recommends that the obligations 
of the directive should also apply to lawyers when they provide tax advice. See the opinion of 25 April 
2005 of the EESC on the proposal for a third anti-money laundering directive, points 3.1.9 and 3.7.1.2. 
[N.B. Although this opinion relates to the third directive, the arguments remain valid as regards the 
first and second directives]. 
48  See for instance, recitals 9 and seq. and Articles 21 and seq. of Directive 2006/43/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006 on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated 
accounts, amending Council directives 78/ 660/EEC and 83/349/EEC and repealing Council Directive 
84/253/EEC, OJ L 157, 9 June 2006, p. 87. This text requires that statutory auditors adhere to the 
highest ethical standards, including standards on integrity and objectivity, and respect the privacy of 
their clients, among others. There are also requirements in relation to confidentiality and professional 
secrecy. 
49  In the Wouters case (C-309/99), the Court of Justice recognised that a rule in the deontological code of 
Dutch lawyers, which prohibited partnership between lawyers and accountants in the Netherlands, could 
reasonably  be  considered  necessary  for  the  proper  practice  of  the  profession  as  organised  by  the 
Member State concerned, despite the effects restrictive of competition that were inherent in it, and did 
not infringed the EC Competition rules. The Court arrived at this conclusion having considered several 
factors,  including  the  specific  national  set-up  and  whether  the  rule  was  proportionate  in  these 
circumstances.  In  that  ruling,  the  Court  of  Justice  considered  that  accountants  were  not  subject  to 
deontological obligations comparable to those of lawyers (cf. §103), but this assessment was in relation 
to the traditional activities of lawyers before the courts.  
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advice  without  acting  on  behalf  of  or  for  the  client  in  relation  to  a  financial 
transaction (which would be subject to the Directive rules).  
5.  EFFECTIVENESS OF THE REPORTING SYSTEM 
37.  This  section  evaluates  the  extent  to  which  the  reporting  system  is  effective  in 
preventing the use and misuse of the financial system for the purposes of money 
laundering. For this, it examines: (1) the reporting trends; (2) the ease of application 
of the reporting obligation; (3) the facilitation of professionals' compliance through 
actions  undertaken  by  the  authorities  and  by  the  self-regulatory  bodies;  (4)  the 
monitoring activities as a tool to increase effectiveness; and (5) the view of the legal 
profession on their own role in the fight against money laundering.  
5.1.  Reporting trends 
38.  This subsection will briefly examine whether lawyers and notaries report suspicions 
transactions;  the  reasons  for  the  low  or  high  number  of  reports,  including  the 
influence of subjective factors in the reporting system; and the extent to which these 
reports are useful for law enforcement purposes. 
39.  The  number  of  reports  made  by  independent  legal  professionals  on  suspicious 
transactions  is  particularly  low  in  the  vast  majority  of  EU  countries,  notably 
compared to the reports made by financial institutions. During the period 2003-2005, 
in the case of notaries, only in Belgium, Estonia, France, Hungary, the Netherlands 
and Poland do the total number of reports amount to at least 10 per year; and only in 
the case of Belgium, France and Poland has the number of reports been above 100 
per year in at least one of the three years considered. In the case of lawyers, figures 
are  even  lower  (with  the  exception  of  the  United  Kingdom):  only  in  Germany, 
Hungary and the Netherlands have the authorities received more than 10 reports from 
lawyers  in  at  least  one  of  the  three  years  examined.  The  reporting  trends  in  the 
United  Kingdom  are  totally  different  and  the  number  of  reports  from  lawyers  is 
significantly higher: above 3000 in 2003, above 9000 in 2004 and above 10000 in 
2005.  
40.  Several  concurring  reasons  seem  to  explain  the  low  numbers  of  reports  from 
independent legal professionals in the majority of countries
50. First of all, there is a 
general perception that  the application by  the professionals of the legal privilege 
exception  in  relation  to  litigation,  in  particular  when  interpreted  extensively, 
contributes  to  the  explanation  for  the  low  numbers.  Secondly,  there  are  practical 
difficulties in applying the rules, as reported by stakeholders (see section 5.2). In 
addition, legal professionals mention the confusion created by the lack of logic and 
complexity of the rules (the insufficient knowledge of market and market practice by 
the legislation is also underlined) as another factor contributing to the diminution of 
the effectiveness of the system. The regime is "one size fits all" in its approach and 
possibly too wide to be effective. Legal professionals claim that it should be more 
risk based/bespoke according to the situation. Lastly, stakeholders also underline that 
the  effectiveness  of  the  reporting  system  may  suffer  from  the  fact  that  the  legal 
                                                 
50  It could be conceivable to argue in this context that there are few reports because there is no money 
laundering happening. The other concurring factors do not appear, however, to confirm this statement.  
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profession is forced to pay excessive attention to the customer due diligence process 
and the related problems, distracting it from the evaluation of potentially suspicious 
transactions. Indeed, the perception of part of the profession is that compliance with 
the Directive means the mere respect of formalities, which is of little help in the 
prevention of money laundering. In this context, the profession also underlines that 
practitioners  have  a  natural  tendency  to  refuse  the  provision  of  legal  services  to 
doubtful clients as a result of the application of the high ethical standards of the 
profession  and  also  in  order  to  avoid  being  implicated  in  any  possible  primary 
offence or to avoid reputational problems for the law firm. 
In the United Kingdom there are specific reasons, on which stakeholders agree, for 
the different (high) figures: firstly, the high penalties foreseen by the legislation in 
case of non reporting (up to five years imprisonment) which leads to "defensive" 
reporting;  secondly  a  committed  enforcement  policy  from  the  authorities  which, 
further to the prosecution of lawyers for absence of reporting, included a largely 
publicised "dawn raid"  on a solicitors' office  for alleged non respect of the anti-
money laundering regulation; thirdly, the very broad definition of criminal activity as 
predicate offence ('all-crimes' approach), which also includes self-laundering (as a 
result, many reports have been submitted in relation to possible tax fraud/evasion or 
in the context of divorce procedures), and no de minimis rule (with the result that 
practitioners spent too much time considering very low value matters); and finally 
certain ambiguity in the interpretation of national law with respect to the need to 
report in the context of litigation, the result being a high prevalence of precautionary 
reporting
51.  
41.  Subjective factors may also have an influence on the number of reports made and 
ultimately  on  the  effectiveness  of  the  reporting  obligations.  Firstly,  many  public 
authorities (and some professional associations, notably representing notaries) are of 
the opinion that the negative perception of the independent legal professionals on the 
proportionality of the Directive obligations in relation to the legal profession has 
probably some effect on the effectiveness of the reporting system. This is perceived 
to be the case because, although legal professionals (no doubt) comply with their 
legal obligations
52, they prefer to avoid situations which would require them to make 
reports and therefore break the relationship of trust with the client which the legal 
profession considers of paramount importance (civil liability versus their clients for 
damage or loss caused by unjustified reports may also play a role here). This view is 
not shared by the legal profession (in particular lawyers) or by a number of public 
authorities. For them, there is no such effect and both lawyers and notaries respect 
the law. In any event, no particular evidence supporting either position or measuring 
the impact can be presented. 
                                                 
51  Given the wide definition of proceeds of crime, barristers and solicitors became worried that they could 
not act for or against clients in civil proceedings, whose assets might in part include the products of tax 
evasion, since by doing so the barrister or solicitor might become involved in "an arrangement…to 
facilitate…the acquisition or retention of the proceeds of crime". However, a decision from the English 
Court of Appeal in 2005, in the case Bowman vs Fels, has clarified that there was no need to report in 
the context of the conduct of ordinary litigation: e.g. acting for a client in legal proceedings could not 
amount to an "arrangement" for the purposes of the Proceeds of Crime Act. 
52  A few public authorities go beyond in their judgement and consider that the negative perception of the 
legal  profession  appreciably  affects  the  reporting  system:  i.e.  the  legal  professionals  would  be 
indifferent to the obligations. Public statements by lawyers are mentioned as evidence of this attitude.  
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Secondly, the confidence of the regulated sector in the reporting system seems to 
diminish as a result of what is perceived by practitioners as unjustified disclosure of 
the  identity  of  the  legal  professionals  making  reports  about  money  laundering 
suspicions.  Not  only  may  such  identity  may  be  disclosed  in  subsequent  related 
judicial proceedings in some Member States 
53, but also legal professionals warn 
about prosecuting authorities leaking indiscriminately the reports, with the risk of 
reprisals against those signing the reports. Such disclosure is perceived as having a 
potential impact on the effectiveness of the reporting system
54. 
42.  Concerning the usefulness of the reports produced by the legal profession for law 
enforcement purposes, the current statistical reporting framework in the vast majority 
of Member States does not collect data linking the specific reports to cases brought 
before  court  and  to,  eventually,  convictions  for  money  laundering  offences
55.  A 
further problem in this area relates to the fact that in some cases, law enforcement 
authorities  have  a  tendency  to  prosecute  primarily  the  predicate  offence,  but  not 
necessarily the money laundering offence that derives from it. Therefore, it is not 
possible to make an informed assessment on this issue.  
In  any  event,  it  should  be  underlined  that  the  effectiveness  of  the  anti-money 
laundering system goes beyond mere quantitative data for its measuring. Indeed, the 
overall purpose of the Directive rules is to prevent the misuse of the financial system 
for  the  purposes  of  money  laundering  and  ultimately  to  preserve  the  stability, 
integrity, soundness and reputation of the Community's financial markets. For this 
purpose the Directive appoints a number of gatekeepers and sets in place a certain 
reporting  mechanism  among  other  measures.  While  the  deterrent  effect  of  the 
measures is an important component of effectiveness, it cannot be subsumed into 
figures. A low level of reports may reflect either an effective preventative system or 
poor application of the measures. In such a context, it is particularly important to 
ensure that the latter does not occur. The effectiveness of processes are of particular 
relevance here (see also section 5.5 on this debate). 
5.2.  Ease of application of the reporting obligation  
43.  This subsection will examine the difficulties identified by the legal professionals in 
the practical application of the reporting obligation. 
44.  The  general perception  from stakeholders is that the reporting obligation has not 
been easily applied in practice by the legal professionals. This perception results in 
particular  from  informal  anonymous  complaints  received  by  the  self-regulatory 
bodies and questions for advice made to these bodies by legal professionals. There 
                                                 
53  In some countries, such as Belgium, France, Hungary, Malta and Portugal, the identity of the reporting 
person is never disclosed. 
54  The  legal  profession  underlines  that  there  are  other  consequences:  risk  of  serious  commercial  and 
physical harm to the legal professional and risk of damaging the public's confidence in the legal system 
as a result of the breakdown in the relationship with the client when the latter discovers that their 
confidential relationship has been breached.  
55  The Commission is aware of this problem, which affects generally the statistical reporting in the justice 
area. It adopted on 8 August 2006 a Communication "Developing a comprehensive and coherent EU 
strategy  to  measure  crime  and  criminal  justice:  an  EU  Action  Plan  2006-2010"  (document 
COM(2006)437). This action plan should allow to have better knowledge about crime levels, crime 
trends and criminal justice.   
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are,  however,  few  records  of  formal  complaints  by  legal  professionals  to  either 
public authorities or self-regulatory bodies on practical difficulties in complying with 
the reporting obligations, except in the United Kingdom. 
45.  The main difficulties experienced by independent legal professionals relate to:  
•  (i)  The  recognition  of  suspicious  transactions.  Firstly,  practitioners  experience 
difficulties in recognising situations in which money laundering could take place. 
A  second  factor  is  that  independent  legal  professionals  do  not  generally  get 
enough information from their clients regarding the transaction concerned. Clients 
do not necessarily disclose their true state of affairs or their financial situation, 
business interest etc. for a single transaction. This may be partially explained by 
their fear of being the subject of a report to the authorities. This problem increases 
in the case of notaries as most of the transactions performed at the notary premises 
are one-off or occasional ones. It is quite unusual to deal with the same client in 
front of the same notary. Thirdly, they consider it difficult to judge the origin of 
the client's funds when they come through the banking system, even if they come 
from tax havens. The combination of these factors enables money launderers to 
stay out of the suspicion "net". The legal professionals indicate in this context 
their own interest in recognising accurately suspicious transactions, so as to avoid 
being implicated in the commission of a primary criminal offence.  
•  (ii) The delimitation of the legal privilege in this context. This problem is mainly 
about striking a balance between the practical application of the "suspicion test" 
and the requirements for the professionals to respect a duty of confidentiality vis-
à-vis their clients
56. It has been underlined by the legal profession that in some 
countries, despite the provisions of Article 9 of the Directive waiving liability in 
case of reporting in good faith, the client can sue the lawyer for breach of secrecy 
in case of unnecessary reporting. This is perceived as a complex issue as it is not 
easy to reconcile all these various and often conflicting obligations. In the absence 
of a clear delimitation in the national law (or in supplementary guidelines) or of a 
clear interpretation by the courts, independent legal professionals anticipate that 
they will continue to be confronted with practical difficulties: you do not always 
get  black  and  white  solutions  from  particularly  difficult  questions.  Lawyers 
underline the cost of reporting, in terms of hours spent and they also point to the 
need  in  some  complex  cases  to  get  additional  external  legal  advice  from 
specialised lawyers in relation to the delimitation of the legal privilege, which 
adds to the cost. 
•  (iii)  The  post-report  period  (the  prohibition  of  tipping  off  and  the  request  for 
consent). Difficulties also arise once the report has been made, where the tipping 
off  provisions  become  applicable
57.  If  a  report  has  been  made,  the  related 
                                                 
56  Lawyers, in particular, consider that the directive has not been easily applied because it has undermined 
the fundamental professional duties of the lawyers and the rights of their clients: i.e. the entire basis of 
the lawyer-client relationship. See also sections 3.2 and 5.5.  
57  In the vast majority of countries tipping off the client is not allowed (in some countries the law foresees 
the possibility to make a disclosure in connection with legal proceedings, but for the purposes of this 
report, the legal privilege situation is treated in section 3.2). However, in a few countries (such as 
Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, Slovenia and Sweden) lawyers (but not 
always  notaries)  are  allowed  to  disclose  to  their  client  (or  to  other  third  person)  that  information  
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transactions are frozen until appropriate consent by the authorities to carry it out is 
given. Lawyers (in particular in the United Kingdom, where most of the reports 
are made) report being forced into situations of trying to carry on their normal 
duties  and  relationship  with  clients  without  committing  a  tipping  off  offence. 
They also consider this to be an impossible moral situation. This has an adverse 
impact in the relationship of the lawyer with the client, which is unfortunate in 
cases where a suspicion of money laundering is found to be ill-founded. Hence, 
legal professionals consider that if consent is not handled expeditiously (and this 
is not always done), it is not only the suspected party who may be prejudiced but 
also innocent parties involved in the transaction. Lawyers also indicate that in case 
of  cross-border  transactions,  consent  has  to  be  requested  to  two  different 
authorities which may provide a different reply. This latter situation is reported to 
have taken place at least in one case.  
46.  These difficulties have an adverse impact on the rate of reporting, as described in the 
preceding section. They also contribute to increasing the negative perception by the 
legal professionals on the proportionality and usefulness of the Directive obligations 
(see section 5.5 on this issue).  
5.3.  Facilitation of compliance by the authorities and by the self regulatory bodies 
47.  In the light of the difficulties described in the precedent subsection, facilitating the 
work of the legal professionals in complying with the rules should be a key element 
for improving the effectiveness of the preventative system. This section will briefly 
present the view of the practitioners on the pro-active role of public authorities and 
the  self-regulatory  bodies  in  facilitating  their  compliance  with  the  obligations  by 
means  other  than  enforcement  activities.  It  will  in  particular  look  at  the  main 
activities,  e.g.  provision  of  training,  provision  of  information  on  typologies, 
provision  of  feedback  on  cases  reported,  preparation  of  general  guidelines  and 
provision of advice on specific cases. 
48.  The  general  view  of  practitioners  is  that  public  authorities  have  done  little  to 
facilitate their compliance with the Directive obligations and should do much more: 
public  authorities  should  not  insist  on  formal  procedures,  but  rather  assist  with 
measures that lead to the intended goals. They criticise in particular that there is 
insufficient  information  from  the  public  authorities  regarding  the  rules  and  the 
practical aspects: legal professionals need to know what to do, but are not always 
told.  Checklists  of  applicable  procedures,  more  training  and  clear  and  reliable 
information should be provided to avoid legal uncertainty.  
49.  While it is true that many public authorities have undertaken activities aiming at 
facilitating  the  application  of  the  Directive,  the  scope  of  these  activities  appears 
limited.  They  have  provided  or  organised  training  activities  (in  many  cases  in 
cooperation  with  the  self-regulatory  bodies),  but  normally  of  limited  scope 
(sometimes  general  presentations  only)  and  often  for  the  benefit  of  the  self-
regulatory bodies or selected groups of professionals only. Some authorities have 
                                                                                                                                                          
indicating money laundering has been transmitted to the relevant authorities or that a money laundering 
investigation is being carried out. It is claimed in these countries that the special confidence relation 
between lawyer and client justifies this conduct.   
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also issued guidelines (or contributed to those issued by the self-regulatory bodies) 
but they do not seem to be particularly highly regarded.  
50.  Few authorities have provided enough or sufficiently systematic information to the 
self-regulatory  bodies,  or  directly  to  the  independent  legal  professionals,  on 
typologies susceptible to imply higher money laundering risks which are of specific 
relevance  to  the  legal  profession.  Some  authorities  raised  the  risk  of  information 
leakage to money launderers, which would allow them to change their pattern of 
activity, as a reason to be cautious in disclosing this information. Obtaining this kind 
of information from the authorities is, however, considered by the legal profession as 
an important element in improving the reporting system: lawyers and notaries need 
to know the common themes. 
Box n° 7 – Information on typologies by public authorities: example 
In Germany, it is a legally standardised task of the FIU to co-operate with the persons subject to the 
Money Laundering Act, and in particular with the regulated professions. This is reflected further to 
incident-related discussion groups and workshops with the regulated professions in, for example, a 
FIU newsletter providing information on typologies and developments. The publication of the FIU 
newsletter has resulted in intensified and improved communication between the FIU and the regulated 
profession.  In  addition,  the  FIU,  supported  by  the  professional  associations  of  the  regulated 
professions, an external consultancy and some Land Criminal Police Offices, developed an online 
information platform. The aim is to inform and sensitise the regulated professionals concerning money 
laundering, including the development and the current state of money laundering control in Germany, 
the stages of money laundering, examples as well as comprehensive information about prevention 
mechanisms and suspicious transaction reports. In addition, the online offer encompasses links to 
other websites dealing with the topic of money laundering and also provides answers to important 
questions that other persons subject to the law might have. 
51.  In many Member States, feedback to the reporting legal professionals, in relation to 
specific  investigations  opened  as  a  result  of  reports  they  made,  is  generally  not 
provided  at  all  by  the  appropriate  authorities,  either  to  the  legal  professional 
concerned, or to the self-regulatory bodies
58. Public authorities rarely undertake other 
specific activities in this field, apart from monitoring activities (see section 5.4). 
Box n° 8 – Feedback on specific cases: examples 
In Latvia, a representative from the Latvian Council of notaries is a member of the advisory board of 
the Control Service, a specialised body which, in accordance with the law, exercises control over 
unusual  and  suspicious  transactions,  and  acquires,  receives,  registers,  processes,  complies,  stores, 
analyses and provides information to pre-trial investigative institutions and the court. In this way, the 
Council of Notaries is informed on a regular basis about on-going events. This information is further 
delivered to notaries. In Germany, the public prosecutor should provide feedback to the reporting 
parties and they have a right to ask for it. Currently, forms are being developed for practical use in 
order to standardise this feedback. In France, the law foresees that the FIU should inform the reporting 
lawyer if his report is communicated to the law enforcement authorities, but as the implementing 
decree  was  adopted  only  recently,  this  procedure  has  not  yet  been  tested.  In  Slovenia,  upon 
completion of investigation on a case for which reasons existed for suspicion of money laundering, the 
FIU notifies the informant in writing. In Denmark, this kind of feedback to the self-regulatory body 
only happens exceptionally. In Spain there is a limited feedback system established by the FIU. 
                                                 
58  The self-regulatory bodies with powers in the reporting system do not provide this kind of feedback 
either, as they lack information.  
EN  27    EN 
52.  The role of the self-regulatory bodies is perceived more positively. Although not 
explicitly required by the Directive, self-regulatory bodies have generally undertaken 
initiatives in assisting (or cooperating) with legal professionals in order to facilitate 
their compliance with the reporting obligations (and other preventative measures). 
Thus, training activities have generally been provided, organised or facilitated by 
several self-regulatory bodies. The percentage of the legal professional population 
reached is unknown, but given the large number of practitioners it is presumably not 
high. Some of these bodies have prepared (or are in the process of preparing) specific 
guidelines related to the anti-money laundering legislation, either on their own or, in 
a few cases, in cooperation with public authorities such as FIUs
59. Guidelines are 
generally very much appreciated by the legal profession as they try to facilitate the 
interpretation of the law, although practitioners also claim that guidance notes are not 
always practical.  
Box n° 9 – Guidelines to facilitate the understanding of the obligations: examples. 
The Law Society of Ireland prepared guidelines intended to provide a guide to solicitors as to best 
practice, rather than to provide a mere legal interpretation of the legislation. These guidelines reflect 
best practice in financial institutions and in third countries: inter alia, they provide recommendations 
in relation to the customer due diligence procedure depending on the client and situation, and on how 
to organise internal reporting procedures in law firms. They contain common indicators of potentially 
suspicious transactions and some forms (e.g. on the verification of the identity of the client for internal 
reporting etc) are provided too.  
The Swedish Bar Association has compiled a guidance/instruction for law firms on how advocates and 
associate lawyers should apply the anti-money laundering rules, and this guidance is published on the 
internet. These guidelines refer to the Swedish financial supervisory authority (Finansinspektionen) 
guidelines. Finansinspektionen issued Regulations/Guidelines in June 2005. This publication contains 
elements  (regulations)  that  are  directly  binding  and  enforceable,  and  other  elements  (general 
guidelines) that are indirectly enforceable and subject to sanctions where the institution is also failing 
to conduct its business in a sound manner. 
In the United Kingdom, the Law Society of England and Wales has published Money Laundering 
Guidance Notes for solicitors. The Guidance was published in pilot form in January 2004. It covers 
(inter alia) the necessary level for knowledge of suspicion, or reasonable grounds for suspicion, of 
money laundering which is the key test in the British legislation. It also covers potential compliance 
methods with the rules, which are purposely intended to be risk-based and focus resources effectively 
whilst ensuring that there are no wasted compliance costs. This Guidance is available electronically 
on the Law Society’s web-site (www.moneylaundering.lawsociety.org.uk). Additional guidance notes 
and information on recent developments in this area are also placed on the Law Society’s website.  
53.  Many self-regulatory bodies provide advice to practitioners on concrete cases, upon 
request, usually on an anonymous basis, before deciding to formalise a report. By 
adopting this careful approach, practitioners (in particular lawyers) try to mitigate 
conflicting obligations (e.g. the respect of the confidentiality in the relationship with 
the  client  and  the  reporting  obligation).  This  activity  does  not  appear  to  be 
systematic, except for some cases (see the following box). In any case, such advice is 
more  often  provided  by  those  self-regulatory  bodies  with  formal  powers  in  the 
reporting system. In some cases, there is a correlation between the request for advice 
                                                 
59  Establishing guidelines (prepared either by the public authorities or by the professional associations) in 
order to facilitate their understanding of the obligations and also in order to facilitate their relations with 
clients is considered important by stakeholders. Experience in the financial sector also supports this 
perception.  
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and the fact that the law or reporting system is of recent application (e.g. notaries in 
Spain with regard to their new reporting system). 
Box n° 10 – Advice to practitioners by the self regulatory bodies  
There are help lines at the disposal of lawyers (for example within the Danish Bar and Law Society 
and the professional ethics department of the Law Society of England and Wales) where specific 
questions can be answered: in 2004, the number of specific enquiries from solicitors in England and 
Wales  exceeded  8000.  Indeed,  the  England  and  Wales  Law  Society  has  developed  a  team  of 
specialists to provide confidential advice and guidance to solicitors (and their staff) on this issue.  
Interestingly,  the  Irish  Law  Society  has  the  opposite  view.  Indeed,  the  Society  cannot  give  legal 
advice in relation to an individual solicitor’s obligations under the legislation. The ‘test’ of whether a 
suspicion exists is a subjective one and can only be met by the solicitor himself. Consequently, the 
Society’s role is confined to providing general guidance as to best practice. When dealing with such 
queries, the Society’s advice is to consult the Society’s Guidance Notes and then consider whether, in 
the specific circumstances, an obligation arises to report the matter to the relevant authorities. If, 
following this exercise, the practitioner still has some doubts as to the appropriate course of action, the 
Society’s advice would be to seek independent legal advice on the matter. 
Besides the provision of training, guidelines, informal advice and the database run by 
the notaries self regulatory body in  Luxembourg (see box 5), no other particular 
measures  or  best  practices  can  be  highlighted,  except  divulgative  articles  in  the 
periodical publications of those bodies. 
5.4.  Monitoring of compliance as a tool to increase effectiveness 
54.  This subsection will briefly examine the extent to which (regular) monitoring of the 
legal professionals' compliance with the obligations by the public authorities can be 
used as a tool for increasing the effectiveness of the reporting system and the views 
of the stakeholders on this issue. 
55.  The existence (or not) of monitoring activities by public authorities does not seem to 
have had any significant effect yet in the reporting system of the majority of Member 
States. Monitoring of compliance by independent legal professionals with the anti-
money  laundering  legislation,  although  not  required  by  the  Directive,  is  already 
performed in some countries, or at least foreseen to start soon. In most cases, it is 
performed  by  the  relevant  self-regulatory  body  in  connection  with  its  usual 
monitoring activities related to law practitioners. In a few cases (Estonia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain), the FIU has been specifically granted 
monitoring  powers  in  respect  of  the  legal  profession.  Only  in  one  country  (the 
Netherlands), a specific independent public body (the Financial Supervision Office) 
has  been  entrusted  with  monitoring  tasks.  Monitoring,  in  particular  for  lawyers, 
appears to be more often incident-related or occasional, although there are examples 
of  more  regular  activities  (see  the  following  box).  Notaries,  on  the  contrary,  are 
subject  to  strict  periodic  and  systematic  supervision  in  some  countries  (such  as 
Estonia, Germany, France and Hungary).  
Box n° 11 – Monitoring of compliance 
In Ireland, the Law Society conducts investigations of the books of account of solicitors' practices on a 
regular basis to monitor compliance with Solicitors’ Accounts Regulations, i.e. to ensure financial 
propriety of practices and proper treatment of clients’ monies. By their nature, these investigations 
require Investigating Accountants to inspect client files whereupon they may be put on notice, or have  
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grounds to suspect, that an offence has been committed under anti-money laundering legislation. The 
Law  Society’s  Investigating  Accountants  are  required  to  make  a  separate  report  to  the  Society’s 
Money Laundering Reporting Committee (MLRC) in circumstances where it appears that a solicitor is 
either a) failing to comply with his obligations under the legislation, or b) actively engaged in money 
laundering activities. The MLRC is responsible for deciding whether a report should subsequently be 
made to the authorities. 
In  the  United  Kingdom,  the  England  and  Wales  Law  Society's  Practice  Standards  Unit  (“PSU”) 
monitors  solicitors’  firms  for  compliance  with  the  Money  Laundering  Regulations  and  the  best 
practice contained in the Law Society’s money Laundering Guidance. The PSU makes approximately 
1,200 visits a year. PSU visits usually take two days per firm by one PSU staff member. PSU has 49 
staff, 70% of whom are solicitors themselves, and some of whom are ex-investment business monitors 
with good experience of monitoring law firms. Money laundering compliance checks by PSU staff are 
at a high level. Money laundering is one of 20 or more areas reviewed at such a high level. 
The policy of the Law Society in this context is to adopt a positive approach and provide support and 
assistance to enable firms to maintain compliance with the Money Laundering Regulations. Thus, it 
concentrates its efforts not only on monitoring but on providing solicitors with the training, guidance 
and  information.  Fostering  a  positive  rather  than  overly-punitive  compliance  environment  should 
encourage solicitors to take on board the new requirements in a more meaningful and ultimately more 
effective manner. In any event, in case of breach of the anti-money laundering rules (treated as a 
material breach of the professional conduct rules), the Law Society is empowered to, inter alia, place 
conditions  on  a  solicitor's  Practicing  Certificate,  adopt  disciplinary  measures,  approve  reports 
requiring a firm to improve an aspect of compliance etc. 
56.  Concerning the possibility to impose sanctions for lack of compliance
60, the self-
regulatory bodies can normally impose disciplinary sanctions or bring a case before a 
public prosecutor or a court. Public authorities can normally impose administrative 
sanctions  (e.g.  fines),  but  not  disciplinary  ones  (with  the  exception  of  the  Dutch 
supervisory body– and some FIUs are entitled to generally withdraw licences for 
undertaking economic activities in case of repeated infringements to the rules). In the 
United  Kingdom,  a  few  legal  professionals  have  already  been  prosecuted  and 
charged with a criminal offence for failure to report suspicious transactions, although 
normally they are prosecuted for the primary offences only. 
57.  Public  authorities  generally  see  value  in  reinforcing  the  monitoring/supervisory 
system (which, incidentally, should be done under the third Anti-Money Laundering 
Directive). Such enhanced monitoring would allow the monitoring bodies to detect 
best practices and spread them among the different practitioners. Monitoring is also 
seen as a strong tool for raising awareness among professionals, which may lead to 
enhanced cooperation of the professionals with the authorities and to an increase of 
reports. For instance, in the Netherlands, the Financial Supervision Office conducted 
pilot studies at some selected law firms that resulted in closer cooperation of this 
body  with  the  professional  associations.  This  view  on  the  reinforcement  of  the 
monitoring  /supervisory  system  is  not,  however,  shared  by  the  professional 
associations,  who  rather  prefer  to  have  discretion  as  to  the  undertaking  of  any 
monitoring activity. Some practitioners are of the view that more monitoring will 
assist  them  in  better  understanding  the  obligations,  thus  contributing  to  a  greater 
effectiveness of the system. 
                                                 
60  To the extent that there is no sufficient comparable statistical data available concerning the number and 
level  of  sanctions  imposed,  no  reliable  information  on  trends  can  be  provided  in  this  document. 
However, it can be noted that disciplinary sanctions and administrative sanctions have been applied and 
that cases have been brought before criminal courts in some Member States.  
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5.5.  The  role  of  independent  legal  professionals  in  the  fight  against  money 
laundering 
58.  As seen in the precedent subsections, the effectiveness of the reporting system also 
depends  on  the  subjective  perception  of  stakeholders  on  the  usefulness  and 
proportionality of the obligations and on their own role in the system. In this context, 
this subsection presents the view of the stakeholders in relation to two important 
questions: 
•  Is the application of the Directive to the legal profession having a real impact in 
the fight against money laundering?  
•  Which  should  be  the  role  of  the  independent  legal  professionals  in  the  fight 
against money laundering?  
The views of the stakeholders are divided on both issues. 
59.  Concerning the impact of the Directive in the fight against money laundering, some 
Member States and some professional organisations representing notaries are of the 
view that the Directive has already had a positive impact in terms of prevention: they 
estimate that, more often than before, suspicious mandates have been declined as a 
result of the deterrent effect of the rules. This preventative role as "gatekeeper" to the 
financial system is praised as helping to close gaps in the system. 
60.  On  the  contrary,  some  Member  States  and  professional  associations  representing 
lawyers are of the view that the application of the Directive to the legal professions 
has not had any impact in the fight against money laundering and, more importantly, 
will not have any impact because of the particularities of the lawyers' work
61 and/or 
the  type  of  (quasi-prosecutorial)  obligations  foreseen  in  the  directive,  which  run 
against the principles of the profession. They also point to the absence of reliable 
prior information about the scale of the problem
62, making it difficult to ascertain 
whether there has now been a reduction in money launderers’ use of professionals.  
They also underline the absence of records or statistics in relation to any criminal 
prosecution  for  a  money  laundering  offence  out  of  reports  made  by  lawyers  in 
respect of their clients
63 and they question the justification of the wide scope of the 
                                                 
61  Specifically as regards barristers, English barristers are of the view that the applicability of the directive 
to  barristers  is  unlikely  to  have  much  of  an  impact  in  the  fight  against  ML  since  the  majority  of 
barristers' work in independent practice is contentious legal work in the courts or in arbitration, and in 
this  context,  there  is  little  evidence  that  money  laundering  is  taking  place.  'Sham  litigation'  being 
conducted by clients as part of a money laundering exercise is extremely unusual. Moreover, they claim 
that it is extremely rare for a barrister to find himself involved in any money laundering scheme in the 
course  of  this  court  work:  there  is  no  evidence  of  people  laundering  their  money  through  court 
judgments or through the award of arbitration tribunals. It is noted that Irish barristers are directly not 
subject to the anti-money laundering rules. 
62  Lawyers  indicate  in  particular  that  there  is  no  evidence  of  research,  studies  or  statistics  about  the 
incidence of money laundering involving the legal profession further to the FATF typologies reports 
(only references given by the authorities of the increased use of professionals for money laundering). 
63  Interestingly, some Member States and notaries' professional associations report on cases discovered 
out of notaries' reports.  
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legal profession’s reporting obligations given the law enforcement outputs directly 
related to these reports. 
61.  Some other stakeholders are slightly more optimistic as to the usefulness of the legal 
profession's  involvement  for  law  enforcement  purposes.  However,  they  predict  a 
lower  impact  than  expected  by  the  legislator  because  the  Directive  obligations, 
initially developed for financial institutions, were extended to the legal professions 
without  taking  more  into  account  the  specificities  and  differences  of  these 
professions compared to those institutions. Other stakeholders point to the need to 
increase the trust of all persons involved in the system to have a higher impact. 
Nevertheless, many stakeholders consider that it is too early to provide an informed 
assessment on the impact of the Directive. 
62.  The views of the stakeholders are also divided as regards which the most effective 
role for the legal profession in the fight against money laundering  could be. For 
several public authorities, the most effective role for the legal profession should be to 
apply the existing rules, although they concede that legal professionals need better 
information  on  what  they  can  and  cannot  do.  While  some  arguments  have  been 
raised to apply the rules to the legal profession without intermediaries (e.g. the self-
regulatory bodies) and without the legal privilege applying, others consider that it is 
not possible to require from legal professionals more than the actual rules, without 
infringing  the  legal  privilege/lawyer-client  confidentiality  principle  and  hence 
putting the work of the legal profession into question. 
63.  Some  of  the  professional  associations  representing  notaries  recommend 
strengthening  the  role  of  notaries,  as  real  introducers.  For  them,  an  increase  of 
notarial  authentication  of  transactions  would  have  a  higher  deterrent  effect  for 
possible money launderers.  
64.  Finally, the professional associations representing lawyers see a totally different role 
for their profession in the fight against money laundering (see the following box). 
They  believe  that  the  risks  should  be  better  targeted  by  the  law  and  that  the 
legislative reply should be proportionate to the identified risks. In this context, they 
believe that the main risks relate to complex corporate and real estate transactions of 
a cross-border nature, activities in which only a minority of legal professionals are 
involved. They are of the opinion that this fight should be conducted primarily by 
financial institutions, as they are better placed and better suited to carrying out this 
function. They also noted that some major countries, such as United States, have 
chosen not to impose reporting obligations upon the legal profession. 
Box n°12 – The role of lawyers in the fight against money laundering – The view of the lawyers 
Firstly, lawyers claim they should be exempted from the obligation to report suspicions of money 
laundering. They are of the opinion that this obligation, originally conceived for financial institutions, 
is not the most suitable means to prevent and combat money laundering in the case of lawyers (and 
possibly other liberal professions) because they are badly placed for intelligence gathering as regards 
financial transactions, nor it is an appropriate measure in their case (because of the contradiction with 
the fundamental rights of the citizens and the role of the legal profession). They also point that this 
obligation is useless: under criminal law, a lawyer who assists his client in the laundering of proceeds 
of crime incurs a penalty for aiding and abetting anyway and would hence definitely not denounce the 
suspicion on money-laundering. Indeed, if any reporting to the authorities is to be made, this should 
only take place in relation to clear cases of (pre-existing) infringements of criminal law (e.g. there is a 
high level of certainty in respect of the illicit nature of the funds or property), not on the basis of a  
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mere suspicion test that irreparably damages the fundamental principle of confidentiality between a 
lawyer and his client.  
Secondly, lawyers consider that their traditional professional rules of conduct, guaranteed by their 
ethical codes and the corresponding disciplinary sanctions in case of breach, is already a good tool in 
the  fight  against  money  laundering.  A  lawyer  can  best  contribute  to  the  prevention  of  money 
laundering when a client can freely consult his lawyer on money laundering issues without the fear of 
being denounced. In this way, the legal advisor has the possibility to prevent his client from taking 
such an action. If clients do not trust that their affairs will remain confidential, they will be less likely 
to reveal to their legal advisor all the facts of their situation or even reluctant to contact him/her 
(fearing potential notification on suspicion by their legal advisor). The effect is that criminality is 
more likely to remain undetected and clients will not receive the appropriate advice to safeguard their 
rights or advice about how to remedy their position lawfully. 
Thirdly,  developing  an  awareness  of  the  risks  posed  by  money  launderers  and  putting  in  place 
preventative measures is an acceptable policy for the legal profession, not least in order to avoid 
putting the profession into disrepute, whether by being involved in money laundering or any other 
kind of related criminality. Hence, a lesser emphasis on criminal penalties and a greater emphasis on 
awareness raising, educating the profession about the risks involved (e.g. by providing guidelines 
and/or information on money laundering typologies/indices) and the development of a genuine risk-
based approach adapted to the needs of the professional (for which less invasive measures already 
contained in the directive, such as identification of the client, record keeping or training are useful) 
would result in a more effective role for the profession. Ultimately, this would be sufficient in order to 
ensure that no money laundering attempt is unwittingly supported by lawyers
64. 
                                                 
64  In this context, the role of public authorities should be limited, not intrusive, with a preference for self-
regulation. If compliance with rules and standards should be monitored, this should be done only by the 
bodies competent for the supervision of the profession (namely the Bar Associations and Law Societies 
in most of the EU).  
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6.  CONCLUSIONS 
65.  This survey shows that the application of the Directive to the legal profession has not 
yet produced the expected impact as regards its application to the legal profession. 
The  slow  transposition  of  the  provisions  of  the  Directive  into  national  law  by 
Member States has resulted in the period of application of its rules being too short to 
assess in the majority of Member States. The different pace of implementation is a 
further  impediment  to  comparisons  among  Member  States.  In  addition,  once  the 
obligations  have  been  transposed  into  national  law,  their  practical  application  by 
practitioners has been particularly difficult, notably as regards the delimitation of 
coexisting opposing obligations for lawyers, such as: the reporting obligation and the 
duty of confidentiality vis-à-vis their clients. The immediate consequence is that it is 
difficult at this stage to make a measured judgment on the effectiveness of the rules. 
With the exception of one country, few objective results can be presented at this 
stage  in  terms  of  reporting  of  suspicious  transactions.  Furthermore,  the  deterrent 
effect  of  the  anti-money  laundering  defences  is,  while  important,  difficult  to 
measure.  
Therefore, improving the effectiveness of the rules appears to be a necessity at the 
present stage. The survey has shown that efforts should concentrate in three main 
areas:  
•  Improving  the  quality  of  the  national  legislation implementing the  anti-money 
laundering rules adopted at European level; 
•  Increasing outreach and awareness efforts; 
•  Exploring  whether  there  are  additional  tools  that  can  be  used  in  facilitating 
compliance. 
66.  In  this  context,  the  enactment  of  the  Third  Directive,  which  incorporates  the 
provisions  of  the  Second  Directive  as  regards  the  legal  profession,  provides  a 
window  of  opportunity  for  Member  States  to  tackle  some  of  the  problems  and 
difficulties in the practical application of the anti-money laundering defences by the 
legal  profession.  This  new  Directive  opens  a  new  transposition  period  in  which 
Member States will be adapting their legal instruments. Targeting the real risks while 
transposing  the  new  Directive  and  therefore  improving  the  quality  of  its 
implementation appear as key elements to render the rules more effective. Better 
implementation could notably consist in Member States taking advantage of the new 
opportunities  that  the  Third  Directive  offers  to  facilitate  the  adjustment  of  the 
performance of the customer due diligence procedures to the real risk involved. In 
particular,  the  survey  has  shown  the  value  of  Member  States  paying  due 
consideration  to  allowing  legal  professionals  to  rely  on  customer  due  diligence 
procedures already performed by trusted third parties, as this would largely facilitate 
the relationships with their clients. Under the new Directive, this is a faculty that 
Member States enjoy, not an obligation, despite the Commission original proposal in 
this regard
65. With regard to the relationships with the client, consideration should 
                                                 
65  COM(2004)448final, of 30 June 2004.  
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also be given to the fact that, in cross border situations, documentary evidence might 
be different according to the national situation. One should avoid in this context that 
national  implementing  legislation  adopts  a  bureaucratic  box-ticking  approach  in 
relation  to  customer  due  diligence  procedures.  Practitioners  should  enjoy  the 
flexibility  offered  by  the  new  Directive  to  adapt  their  conduct  and  their  internal 
procedures to the perceived risk. Indeed, the large majority of clients are not money 
launderers.  
67.  In this survey, the survey has also shown a particular need for increasing outreach 
and  awareness  efforts,  in  particular  as  regards  lawyers,  both  by  the  national 
authorities and the self-regulatory bodies. It appears from the survey that it would be 
useful to raise awareness among the legal profession, not just on the anti-money 
laundering  obligations  arising  from  the  directive,  but  also  on  the  question  of  the 
possible commission by legal professionals of a primary offence in case they are 
unwittingly involved in money laundering schemes. Facilitation of compliance with 
the  anti-money  laundering  rules,  in  particular  for  small  law  firms  and  individual 
practitioners,  will  be  essential  for  reinforcing  the  effectiveness  of  the  rules.  For 
instance, the profession is eager to receive better guidance on the scope of the rules, 
particularly as regards the delimitation between the legal privilege and the reporting 
obligation, which is not easy to make. Indeed, in the majority of countries, the short 
period of application of the rules has not allowed for sufficient experience in this 
regard. Further to the clarifications that the Court of Justice may provide on this 
delimitation at European level, it appears appropriate that this type of guidance is 
adopted  at  national  level,  either  by  the  authorities,  the  self-regulatory  bodies  or 
preferable  through  joint  cooperation,  as  this  would  allow  to  better  cater  for  the 
different  national  traditions  regarding  the  legal  privilege.  Further  to  the  need  for 
provision  of  guidance,  this  survey  has  also  showed  the  added  value  that  self-
regulatory  bodies  may  provide  in  this  field.  The  Commission  services  note  with 
particular interest the role adopted by some of these bodies in providing specific 
services  to  their  affiliates,  such  as  operating  common  databases,  with  a  view  to 
rendering the application of the obligations easier. Equally, the Commission services 
anticipate in this regard that authorities, including supervisory bodies and European 
institutions, have an important role to play in providing guidance to the professionals 
and enforcing supervisory  policies  as regards the practical implementation of the 
approach based on the risk, which allows for tailored responses rather than one-size-
fits-all solutions. Work in this regard has already started at the FATF level as well as 
at the European level.  
68.  Finally,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  Commission  services  are  exploring  whether 
additional  tools  can  be  used  in  reply  to  some  of  the  problems  identified  in  this 
survey, in particular those which have a clear cross-border character. This relates for 
instance  to  obtaining  corporate  identity  documents  (statutes  etc.)  in  cross  border 
situations: e.g. the Commission is funding a research programme, the so-called Brite 
project
66, in relation to cross-border access to business registries. It is also noticeable 
                                                 
66  www.briteproject.net. This project aims at facilitating cross-border access to information contained in 
business  registries,  including  the  provision  of  certified  copies  of  this  information.  This  project  is 
considering extending its scope to better address the needs of the legal professionals (and generally of 
the persons and entities subject to the rules of the Directive) in relation to the anti-money laundering 
obligations.  
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in this regard that the Commission has also launched a cost-benefit study
67 in relation 
to the upfront disclosure of large holdings in unlisted companies. Such disclosure 
could  facilitate  obtaining  information  of  who  the  beneficial  owner  is.  The 
identification of the beneficial owner remains a difficult issue, as shown by a recent 
report from the FATF
68.  
69.  The aim of this survey was to describe how the directive has been applied in practice 
to the legal profession and to outline the main practical difficulties arising from this 
application.  This  survey will  also  provide  a  basis  for  a  future examination  to  be 
conducted  before  15  December  2009  on  the  application  of  the  new  Directive 
2005/60/EC to this sector
69.  
                                                 
67  Call for tender JLS/2005/D2/01. This study was preceded by a shorter scoping study. 
68  Report from the Working Group on Typologies, October 2006: "Misuse of corporate vehicles including 
trust company services provider activity?" 
69  See Article 42 of Directive 2005/60/EC. 